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ABSTRACT
Information problems in small enterprise credit markets
can result in a market equilibrium characterized by credit
rationing. These information problems are potentially more
severe during sharp economic downturns such as the recent
Great Recession. Government interventions to alleviate
credit constraints on small firms need to be designed to
correct the specific market failure resulting in socially
suboptimal credit flows. We argue that Small Business
Administration loan guarantees are a potentially
appropriate intervention and provide a review of empirical
research that supports our contention.
I. THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE
Propagated largely by a boom and bust cycle in the residential real
estate market, the financial crisis of 2007-2009 spilled over into the real
economy producing the longest business cycle downturn of the post war
era.' The Great Recession, as it became to be known, sparked a political
response that included the appropriation of $700 billion for the Troubled
Asset Relief Program (TARP) in the Fall of 2008 to rehabilitate the
financial system by shoring up the balance sheets of major financial firms. 2
This was followed by The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of
2009, commonly referred to as the stimulus package, which provided for
* Ben Craig and James Thomson are economists in the research department at the
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. William E. Jackson III is the Smith
Foundation Chair of Business Ethics and Integrity at the University of Alabama.
The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not those of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Cleveland, or the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System.
1 According to the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) the Great
Recession started in December of 2007 and ended in June of 2009. See Business
Cycle Dating Committee, NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH (Sept. 20, 2010),
http://www.nber.org/cycles/sept20l0.html.
2 For a description of TARP, see Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP)
Information, BD. GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYs. (Apr. 21, 2010),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/tarpinfo.htm.
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$862 billion in new federal expenditures to combat the continued slowdown
in economic activity.3 In both cases, opening up the public purse was seen
as an antidote to the collapse in economic activity.
TARP was part of efforts to restore credit flows, particularly bank
lending, in an effort to kick-start economic growth. Of particular concern
would be access to credit by small businesses who would be most affected
by a retrenchment of bank lending. After all, unlike large firms, small
businesses cannot directly access capital markets. Hence, the continued
decline in bank credit facilities and especially bank commercial credit
facilities from the onset of the crisis through the end of 2010 is likely to
have a disproportionate impact on growth in the small business sector.4 This
in turn could affect the strength and sustainability of the economic
recovery.
Concerns about access to credit for small business, particularly when
there is a retrenchment in the growth of bank supplied credit, are grounded
in economic theory-information problems in credit markets can lead to
credit rationing. Greater uncertainty during business cycle downturns has
the potential to exacerbate credit rationing. So it is not surprising that calls
for government intervention into small enterprise credit markets reach a
crescendo during the trough of the credit cycle.
Even in the best of times small businesses have enjoyed wide political
support as evidenced by the large number and variety of subsidies, direct
and indirect, which have been directed to the small business sector.
Whether government intervention in small enterprise credit markets is
warranted is not the central issue here. Rather, it is whether the net social
3 John F. Cogan & John B. Taylor, What the Government Purchases Multiplier
Actually Multiplied in the 2009 Stimulus Package (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Res.,
Working Paper No. 16505, 2010), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
bankinforeg/tarpinfo.htm.4 See Matthew Koepke & James B. Thomson, Economic Trends: Bank Lending,
FED. RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND (Mar. 23, 2011),
http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/trends/2011/0411/0 lbanfin.cfm?WT.oss=Ec
onomic Trends: Bank Lending&WT.oss r=2190.
5 Direct subsidies to small businesses include tax breaks (subchapter S
organizational form), direct loans and loan guarantees. Indirect subsidies to this
sector of the economy include funding-related subsidies available to lenders such
as the ability for community financial institutions to pledge small business and
small farm loans as collateral for advances from the Federal Home Loan Banks and
a lower capital charge for bank small business loan portfolios in the Basel II
international capital accords. For a discussion of the use of small business loans as
collateral for Federal Home Loan Bank Advances, see Ben R. Craig & James B.
Thomson, Federal Home Loan Bank Lending to Community Banks: Are Targeted
Subsidies Desirable?, 23 J. FIN. SERVICE RES. 5, 6 (2003). A discussion of the firm
size adjustment for bank capital in Basel II can be found in International
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised
Framework, THE BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION 78 (2006), available at
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/fcic/fcic.pdf.
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benefit of a particular intervention is positive-weighing in the direct cost
of the intervention and the costs associated with the unintended impact of
government interventions on private incentives. For this to be the case, the
intervention should be designed to correct the market failure. Small
Business Administration (SBA) loan guarantees are arguably such an
intervention.
In what follows we present evidence that bank lending and in particular
small business lending has declined over the recent economic downturn.
We then describe the economics of small enterprise credit markets. Next,
we outline how in theory SBA loan guarantees can help complete the
market. We then provide an overview of some of our empirical work on
SBA loan guarantees that supports our contention that SBA loan guarantees
are one of the few government interventions in small enterprise credit
markets that may produce positive net social benefits.
A. Bank Lending Over the Recent Economic Cycle
The onset of the financial crisis in 2007 and the sharp business cycle
downturn that followed produced a sharp retrenchment in credit markets.
Of greatest concern for the small business sector was the contraction of
bank lending. Figure 1 shows that business loans on the balance sheets of
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) insured banks and thrifts
grew throughout most of the past decade, while business loan balances and
small business loan balances contracted sharply in mid-2009. Small
business loan balances held by FDIC-insured institutions have continued to
decline through the first quarter of 2011.
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This decline in small business loan balances appears to be driven by
both a contraction in loan supply and a retrenchment in loan demand. As
seen in Figure 2, the Federal Reserve's Senior Loan Officer Opinion survey
shows a ratcheting up of underwriting standards starting in the Fourth
Quarter of 2007 and a decline in small business loan demand starting in
Fourth Quarter of 2006. While there seems to be some reversal in these
trends since the middle of 2010, small business loan balances at FDIC-
insured institutions showed few signs of rebounding in early 2011.
1 eigur 2. Senior 1,oan Officer Survey: Supply and Demand of C&I
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The decline in small business loan balances at FDIC-insured banks and
thrifts is of concern because, for reasons outlined in the next section, the
small business sector is particularly dependent on banks and thrifts for
credit. According to the Federal Reserve's 2003 Survey of Small Business
Finances, 96% of small businesses surveyed relied on depository
institutions for at least one financial service. 6 Commercial banks were listed
as the most common source of business credit (lines of credit, loans and
capital leases) with 41% of small businesses surveyed relying on banks for
one or more of these credit products.7
Concerns about the decline in credit access by small firms are only
heightened when one considers recent evidence on indirect bank credit.
That is, credit used by entrepreneurs to fund their businesses that does not
6 Traci L. Mach & John D. Wolken, Financial Services Used by Small Businesses:
Evidence from the 2003 Survey of Small Business Finances, 92 FED. REs. BULL.
Al 67, Al 84 (Oct. 2006), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/
2006/smallbusiness/smallbusiness.pdf.7 Id. at Al86.
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show up on a bank's books as a business loan, such as credit cards and
home equity lines of credit. A recent article details the impact of the
disruption of the securitization market on small business access to credit.8
Specifically, it shows that just prior to the financial crisis, the broad credit
markets provided nearly 23% of small business credit-much of this in the
form of securitized bank lending. 9 The sharp contraction at the onset of the
financial crisis in the issuance of asset-backed securities and collateralized
mortgage obligations, two sources of off-balance sheet financing of small
firm credit, further reduced credit sources for small business.' °
Small business finances have been further constrained by the 2006
downturn in housing prices. After all, an important source of credit for
small business owners is the equity in their homes." While the importance
of home equity lines of credit as a source of small business financing is
difficult to document precisely, the available evidence shows that in 2007
the median balance on a home equity line of credit for self-employed
households was more than double that of households that were not small
business owners. 2 Moreover, it is estimated that the housing market
collapse starting in 2006 has been accompanied by a $31.5 billion reduction
in home equity lines of credit, with the largest declines in these lines in
states with the biggest home price correction.
1 3
B. The Economics of Small Enterprise Credit Markets
Fundamental information problems in small enterprise credit markets
can produce a market equilibrium that is inefficient as lenders undersupply
loans. While deviations from market efficiency may be slight, and hence,
do not merit corrective public intervention, there are cases where
information problems are severe enough that they lead to credit rationing
and constitute the failure of the credit market. In their seminal work on
information problems in credit markets, Joseph Stiglitz and Andrew Weiss
demonstrate that price alone may not equilibrate demand and supply in
credit markets.' 4 They also show that the corresponding disequilibrium
would unlikely be just a temporary phenomenon.
8 James A. Wilcox, Securitization and Small Business, 22 FED. RES. BANK OF S.F.
ECON. LETTrER, 1 (July 18, 2011), available at http://www.frbsf.org/publications/
economics/letter/201 1/e12011-22.pdf
9 Id. at 3, Figure 1.
'
0 d. at 4, Figure 2.
" 1 See Mark E. Schweitzer and Scott A. Shane, The Effect of Falling Home Prices
on Small Business Borrowing, 18 FED. RES. BANK OF CLEVELAND ECON.
COMMENT. (Dec. 20, 2010), available at http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/
commentary/2010/2010-18.pdf.
12 Id. at 3, Figure 2.13 Id. at 4, Figure 3.
14 Jospeh E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect
Information, 71 AM. ECON. REV 393 (1981).
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Importantly, Stiglitz and Weiss show that in equilibrium a loan market
may be characterized by credit rationing. They reason that banks making
loans are concerned about the interest rate they receive on the loan and the
risk of the loan. However, the interest rate may itself affect the risk of the
pool of bank loans by either sorting potential borrowers (the adverse
selection effect) or influencing the actions of borrowers (the moral hazard
effect). Both effects derive directly from the imperfect information that is
present in loan markets after banks have evaluated loan applications. When
the price (interest rate) affects the nature of the transaction, it is unlikely
that price will also clear the market.
1 5
The adverse selection effect is a consequence of different borrowers
having different likelihoods of repaying their loans, a probability known to
the borrowers but not the lenders. The expected return to the bank on a loan
obviously depends on the probability of repayment, so the bank would like
to be able to identify borrowers who are more likely to repay. It is difficult
to identify such borrowers, partially because the borrowers have more
information than the lender. 16 Typically, the bank will use a variety of
screening devices to do so. The interest rate that a borrower is willing to
pay may act as one such screening device. For example, those who are
willing to pay a higher interest rate are likely to be, on average, worse risks
if borrowers are willing to borrow at a higher interest rate because they
perceive their probability of repaying the loan to be lower. So, as the
interest rate rises, the average "riskiness" of those who are willing to
borrow increases, and this may actually result in lowering the bank's
expected profits from lending.
Similarly, as the interest rate and other terms of the contract change, the
behavior of the borrower is also likely to change. For instance, raising the
interest rate decreases the payoffs of successful projects. Higher interest
rates may thus induce firms to undertake riskier projects-projects with
lower probabilities of success but higher payoffs when successful. In other
words, the price a firm pays for credit may affect the riskiness of its
investment decisions, which is the moral hazard problem.
As a result of these two effects, a bank's expected return may increase
less for an additional increase in the interest rate; and, beyond a certain
point, may actually decrease as the interest rate is increased. Clearly, under
these conditions, it is conceivable that the demand for credit may exceed
15 In the absence of adverse selection, lenders could simply offer loan rates to
borrowers that reflected the average risk of the pool of borrowers. This is because
each loan made would reflect a random draw from the pool of borrowers. If the
bank made a large number of small loans to borrowers in the pool then the bank's
loan portfolio would have the same risk and return characteristics of the pool of
borrowers.16 See Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, Corporate Financing and
Investment Decision When Firms Have Information That Investors Do Not Have,
13 J. OF FIN. ECON. 187, 195-96 (1984).
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the supply of credit in equilibrium. 7 Although traditional analysis would
argue that in the presence of an excess demand for credit, unsatisfied
borrowers would offer to pay a higher interest rate to the bank, bidding up
the interest rate until demand equals supply, it does not occur in this case.
This is because the bank will not lend to someone who offers to pay the
higher interest rate, as such a borrower is likely to be a worse risk than the
average current borrower. The expected return on a loan to this borrower at
the higher interest rate may actually be lower than the expected return on
the loans the bank is currently making. Hence, there are no competitive
forces leading supply to equal demand, and credit is rationed.
As a single price cannot clear the lending market, a "second price" or
screening mechanism may be required. Examples of second prices in
lending markets include: the use of credit scores, collateral, loan
commitments (which involve two-part pricing, a fixed fee for the line of
credit and lending rate attached to the loan) and relationships. Relationships
are a form of informal loan commitment and have been recognized by
economists as an important market mechanism for reducing credit
rationing.18 Lending is based on limited information on the quality of
borrowers in the market, but a close and continued interaction between a
firm and a bank may provide a lender with sufficient information about, and
a voice in, the firm's affairs so as to lower the cost and increase the
availability of credit. Conditional on its positive past experience with the
borrower, the bank may expect future loans to be less risky, which should
reduce its average cost of lending and increase its willingness to provide
funds.
The relationship-lending literature suggests that in addition to being
formed over time, relationships can be built through interaction over
multiple products. That is, borrowers may obtain more than just loans from
a bank. Borrowers may purchase a variety of financial services such as
checking and savings accounts. These added dimensions of a relationship
can affect the firm's borrowing cost in two ways. First, they increase the
precision of the lender's information about the borrower. For example, the
17 See Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell, The Economics of Small Business
Finance: The Roles of Private Equity and Debt Markets in the Financial Growth
Cycle 22(8) J. BANKING & FIN. 613 (1998); Ari Hyytinen & Lotta Vandinen,
Where Do Financial Constraints Originate From: An Empirical Analysis of
Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Capital Markets, 27 SMALL BUS. ECON.
323 (2006).
18 See Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell, Relationship Lending and Lines of
Credit in Small Firm Finance, 68(3) J. Bus. 351 (1995); Edward J. Kane & Burton
G. Malkiel, Bank Portfolio Allocation, Deposit Variability, and the Availability
Doctrine, 79(1) Q. J. ECON. 113 (1965); Mitchell A. Peterson & Raghuram G.
Raj an, The Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence From Small Business
Data, 49(1) J. FIN. 3 (1994).
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lender can learn about the firm's sales by monitoring the cash flowing
through its checking account or by factoring the firm's accounts
receivables. Second, the lender can spread any fixed costs of monitoring the
firm over multiple products.
Overall, the available evidence points to a significantly positive
relationship between factors related to the strength and duration of the
lending relationships among banks and small business customers and both
the terms (lower loan rates and fewer loan covenants) and availability of
credit. From the perspective of the banks, the stronger the relationship, the
more likely the borrower is to select the bank for future credit needs and
other banking services. However, because relationships may be more costly
for small businesses to establish relative to large businesses, and because
lack of relationships may lead to severe credit rationing in the small
business credit market, some form of government intervention to assist
small businesses in establishing relationships with lenders may be
appropriate.
II. SBA LOAN GUARANTEES
SBA loan guarantees may improve credit allocation by providing a
mechanism for pricing loans that is independent of borrower behavior. In
other words, loan guarantees are another way of mitigating credit rationing
in small enterprise loan markets. They serve as a substitute for collateral
and/or relationships in the loan decision process and in theory should result
in an increase in credit extended to small businesses. By reducing the
downside losses associated with loan defaults, the guarantee allows the
lender to charge a lower interest rate on the loan, which reduces both the
adverse selection and moral hazard problems. In addition, SBA loan
guarantee programs may improve the intermediation process by lowering
the risk to the lender of extending longer-term loans, ones that more closely
meet the needs of small businesses for capital investment. As such, SBA
loan guarantee programs potentially improve credit allocation in small
enterprise loan markets by providing a better set of market completion
services than private remedies alone. Of course, as any government
intervention into markets, SBA loan guarantees likely distort credit markets
in unintended ways-possibly resulting in an oversupply of loans to small
enterprises and reducing economic efficiency. Ultimately, the net effect of
SBA loan guarantees is an empirical question that we have looked at in a
number of earlier papers.' 9
19 See Ben R. Craig, William E. Jackson III & James B. Thomson, Credit Market
Failure Intervention: Do Government Sponsored Small Business Credit Programs
Enrich Poorer Areas? 30(4) SMALL Bus. ECON. 345 (2008); Ben R. Craig, William
E. Jackson III & James B. Thomson, SBA-Loan Guarantees and Local Economic
Growth, 45 J. SMALL Bus. MGM'T. 116 (2007).
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The empirical question of interest to us was whether SBA loan
guarantees improve the functioning of small business credit markets-a
necessary condition for them having net social benefits. Unfortunately, data
limitations precluded us from directly testing this hypothesis. Consequently,
we turned to an indirect approach. A necessary condition for SBA loan
guarantees to have net positive social benefits is that they have a positive
impact on economic outcomes. As the effect of these programs would be
the greatest at the local level, we focused our analysis there. What we did in
our papers is test whether a measure of SBA loan guarantees, scaled to a
market, impact measures of local economic performance-using
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) and rural (non-MSA) counties as our
definition of the local market. Our sample period ran from 1991 through
2001. Depending on the nature of the question asked we used either per
capita personal income or employment as the measure of economic
performance.20
Overall, our work found evidence consistent with SBA loan guarantees
improving the allocation of credit in small business loan markets. In Craig,
Jackson, and Thomson (2008), we found a positive and significant
correlation between the average annual level of employment in a local
market and the level of SBA guaranteed lending in that local market.21 The
intensity of this correlation is relatively larger in low-income markets.22
Indeed, one interpretation of our results is that this correlation is positive
and significant only in low-income markets.3 In Craig, Jackson, and
Thomson (2007) we found that the level of SBA-guaranteed lending
activity (per $1000 of deposits) is positively related to the growth of per
capita income at the local market level-for both urban and rural markets.24
The impact of SBA-guaranteed lending on growth appears to be small.
25
However, this small measurable economic impact of SBA loan guarantees
on local economic growth is expected given the limited role they play in the
overall (small and large firm) credit intermediation process. We have
extended these basic results in a number of ways to get a better idea of what
is driving the positive relationship between measures of SBA loan
guarantees and local economic performance.26 In those papers we also find
20 For a more detailed description of the empirical experiment, data and sample
period see Craig, Jackson & Thomson (2007), supra note 19, at 122-24; Craig,
Jackson & Thomson (2008), supra note 19, at 351-53.
21 Craig, Jackson & Thomson (2008), supra note 19, at 345.
22 Id.
23 Craig, Jackson & Thomson (2008), supra note 19, at 351-53.
24 Craig, Jackson & Thomson (2007), supra note 19, at 122-2421 d. at 116.
26 Ben R. Craig, William E. Jackson III & James B. Thomson, On Government
Intervention in the Small Firm Credit Market and Economic Performance,
ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN EMERGING DOMESTIC MARKETS: BARRIERS AND
INNOVATION 47 (2007). Extensions of our work can be found in Ben R. Craig,
William E. Jackson III and James B. Thomson, Does Small Business
Administration Guaranteed Lending Improve Economic Performance in Low-
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that the relationship between SBA loan guarantees and local economic
performance is stronger in markets with high shares of minority populations
and in less-financially developed areas.27
The results from our studies need to be interpreted with caution. For
one, data limitation does not allow us to control for small-business lending
at the local market level, so we do not know whether SBA loan guarantee
programs are contributing to economic performance by helping to complete
the market for small firm credit or whether they are simply proxying for
small business lending in the market. This might be the case if there is a
positive correlation between the level of SBA loan guarantees and small
business lending in a market. Second, we are not able to test whether SBA
loan guarantees materially increase the volume of small business lending in
a market-are SBA guaranteed credits simply being substituted for non-
guaranteed small business loans? This question gets to the heart of whether
SBA programs improve social welfare because it is related to who captures
the subsidy associated with SBA loan guarantees. In other words, finding a
positive correlation between measures of SBA guarantees and local
economic performance is only the first step towards establishing the
desirability of these programs. More evidence is needed to establish that
SBA guaranteed lending programs are welfare enhancing.
III. CONCLUSIONS
Small businesses are likely to remain a sacred cow of public policy.
The popular view, founded or unfounded, that small businesses are the
engine of economic growth and development means they are likely to enjoy
continued government support-consternation by policymakers over the
terms and access to credit by small business in the most recent economic
cycle is consistent with this view. However, government interventions into
small enterprise credit markets are likely to produce net social benefits only
Income Areas? Entrepreneurship in Low- and Moderate- Income CommunitiesI,
2010(18) Economic Commentary 55, available at http://wwwkansascityfed.org/
publicat/commaffrs/08%20Jackson.pdf; Ben R. Craig, William E. Jackson III and
James B. Thomson, 2006, On SBA Guaranteed Lending and Economic Growth
(Fed. Res. Bank of Cleveland Working Paper 04-03, 2004); Ben R. Craig, William
E. Jackson III & James B. Thomson, Small Firm Credit Market Discrimination,
Small Business Administration Guaranteed Lending, and Local Market Economic
Performance, 613 (1) ANNALS AM. ACAD. OF POL. SOC. SCI. 73 (2007); Craig
Armstrong, Ben R. Craig, William E. Jackson III & James B. Thomson, The
Importance of Financial Market Development on the Relationship Between Loan
Guarantees for SMEs and Local Market Employment Rates (Federal Reserve Bank
of Cleveland, Working Paper 10-20, 2010); Ben R. Craig, William E. Jackson III &
James B. Thomson, 2006, Does Small Business Administration Guaranteed
Lending Improve Economic Performance in Low-Income Areas?, 55-85;
Conference, Entrepreneurship in Low- and Moderate- Income Communities
t2006).7 Craig, Jackson & Thomson (2007), supra note 26, at 90-91.
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in those cases where the intervention is motivated by and designed to
correct a market failure. Loan guarantee programs such as those offered by
the Small Business Administration may be one such intervention.
Moreover, in our previous work on SBA loan guarantees we find evidence
that is consistent with SBA loan guarantees producing positive net social
benefits. Considerably more work, however, needs to be done before the
desirability of this government intervention can be established.
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